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Kruse: Was That Ethical?

Was That Ethical? Feminist Critics’ Response to the
“Queerness” of Modernist Women’s Writing
Meridith M. Kruse, The New School for Liberal Arts
Abstract: This article employs insights from contemporary theories of ethical reading to conduct a case
study of feminist critics’ reaction to the queerness of modernist women’s writing. My aim is to develop a set
of practices and principles for ethically responding to queerness in literary texts and everyday life, as well
as contribute feminist acumen to the current claim that the humanities are the best site to train students
how to do justice to texts. The introduction utilizes theories of ethical reading set forth by Jane Gallop and
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick to develop a preliminary framework of ethical response. The subsequent section
provides a historical overview of feminist critics’ reaction to the queerness of modernist women’s literature.
I then take my preliminary framework “into the field” to see what it can tell us about how Marianne DeKoven
and Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar react toward one type of queerness: Gertrude Stein’s experimental
language. In my conclusion, I employ the knowledge gained from this analysis along with my theoretical
framework to offer feminist insights to the contemporary claim that the humanities are the optimal location
to teach ethical reading.
Keywords: ethics of reading, feminist criticism, queer theory, modernist women’s writing
Copyright by Meridith M. Kruse
Introduction
In the past decade, scholars in the humanities have become increasingly interested in the question of what
constitutes an ethical interpretation of a text. In April of 2012, a host of leading academics, including Judith
Butler, Patricia Williams, and Homi Bhabha, gathered at Princeton University for the conference “The
Ethics of Reading: The Humanities in the Public Sphere.” The conference was not an isolated event at
Princeton, but rather one part of a three-year series of seminars and lectures dedicated to exploring the
theme of ethical reading at this leading university. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century there
have also been a flurry of publications about this topic, prominent examples of which include Jane Gallop’s
“The Ethics of Reading: Close Encounters” (2000), Lawrence Buell’s “What We Talk about When We Talk
about Ethics” (2000), and Santiago Colás’s “Toward an Ethics of Close Reading in the Age of Neoliberalism”
(2007).
For some scholars, a focus on ethical reading has been paired with a desire to articulate the significance of
the humanities at a time when this field is under threat. The humanities should be valued, some academics
argue, because language and literature classes are among the few remaining sites where students still
receive training in how to do justice to texts. Gallop has proposed, for example, that close reading is not only
a form of ethical interpretation but also a way for the field of English to avoid “disciplinary suicide” (Gallop
2007, 184). While not everyone would agree with Gallop that close reading is a key way to ethically relate
to texts (or save the humanities), there is a growing sense among many scholars of language and literature
that their field is best situated to help students learn how to appreciate the complexity of texts—and that
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this is one of the main reasons why the humanities should be valued by the larger university community
and general public.
While I am sympathetic to the idea that the humanities are uniquely situated to provide training in
ethical reading, I want to make sure that in making this argument we do not resurrect the limited, retrograde
notion of ethics that was at the heart of New Critical ideology in the 1940s and 50s. The New Critics’ call
to attend to “the text itself” was often seen as a way to meet one’s ethical obligation to properly appreciate
the internal structure of a great work of art. In The Well Wrought Urn (1947), for example, Cleanth Brooks
casts the critic’s responsibility to textual form as an unavoidable ethical imperative when he asserts: “The
question of form, of rhetorical structure, simply has to be faced … it is the primary problem of the critic. If
there is such a thing as poetry, we are compelled to deal with it” (1975, 222). In the 1960s, African-American,
feminist, and other so-called politically motivated critics demonstrated, however, that New Criticism was
also interlaced with racism and sexism. For most New Critics, the only literature worthy of attentive, ethical
reading was the canonical work of white male authors such as Keats or Pound.1 In retrospect, most scholars
now agree the New Critical sense of ethics was actually a great source of injustice for women authors and
writers of color whose work was largely ignored by this influential school of literary interpretation.
If, as scholars today increasingly assert, the humanities can train students how to do justice to texts, it is
important to acknowledge our institutional history of unethical practices and take time to reflect on what,
exactly, we mean by “ethical reading” in order to avoid repeating past mistakes. Numerous scholars working
in feminist and queer theory, such as Gallop and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, have made recent contributions
toward this project with their efforts to articulate an ethics of reading for the twenty-first century that is
informed by feminist and queer insights. In the opening section of this paper, I will introduce Gallop’s and
Sedgwick’s contemporary models of ethical reading. Although neither scholar explicitly links her work to a
larger school of ethical philosophy, I will show how their ideas resonate with Emmanuel Levinas (in the case
of Gallop) and Carol Gilligan (in the case of Sedgwick). I will then use Gallop’s and Sedgwick’s models as a
flexible framework to assess the ethics of feminist critics’ response to the queerness of modernist women’s
writing. Using Gallop’s and Sedgwick’s work to evaluate this response will give us a better appreciation for
what it actually takes, in practice, to do justice to queerness in literary texts and daily life and, in turn, will
help us articulate a more informed contemporary ethics of reading for the humanities.
Gallop’s and Sedgwick’s Models of Ethical Reading
Feminist theorist Jane Gallop is well known in the field as an exemplary close reader.2 Gallop has employed
close reading in all of her books and teaches this method in all of her classes, regardless of topic (Gallop
2000, 7). Despite her long-standing commitment to close reading, however, Gallop has only recently begun
to theorize the ethical value of this method. One of the first places she takes up this project is “The Ethics of
Reading: Close Encounters,” where she draws on her experience as a teacher of multiculturalism to outline
an ethics of reading that can help students hear what women authors and authors of color are “actually
saying, rather than just confirming [their] preconceptions” (2000, 12). In this essay, Gallop constantly
distinguishes between what an author is “actually saying” and a reader’s “projection” of their words. Her
main goal is to find a way for us to overcome our tendency to stereotype texts and people—especially those
that challenge our preconceived notions—so we can see difference, learn, and be surprised. Interestingly,
Gallop does not believe this mode of relating is a choice, but rather casts it as an “ethical obligation” and
“duty” (12). She ultimately argues that close reading, which forces one to pay attention to what is actually
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on the page, can be a tool to train students how to enact a more just response to literary texts and the people
they encounter in everyday life.
While Gallop does not connect her sense of ethics in “The Ethics of Reading” to the work of the prominent
twentieth-century French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, I would argue there are significant resonances
between the two. In Totality and Infinity (1961), Levinas asserts that “the other,” which he also refers to as
“the face of the other” or “the stranger, the widow, and the orphan” (Levinas 2011, 215), not only impels us
to prioritize the needs of others ahead of our own but actually constitutes the self. Attempting to explain
this enigmatic idea in his introduction to Levinas’s Humanism of the Other (1972), Richard Cohen writes:
One is not called on to “love thy neighbor as oneself,” according to the biblical precept, as if self-love preceded
other-love and were the measure of other-love. Rather, the proper formulation of Levinas’s thought is more
extreme … to “love thy neighbor is oneself”.… Care for the other trumps care for the self, is care for the self.
Nothing is more significant. (Cohen 2006, xxvii)

Here Cohen helps us see that Levinas’s idea of ethics includes a subject completely given over to the
other, a subject whose care for the self only emerges through concern for the other. Interestingly, this
echoes the world depicted in Gallop’s essay, where she evokes a reader who is obligated, or duty-bound, to
respect the other (to hear what a text, or person, is “actually saying”) without any mention of the needs a
particular subject might bring to the interpretive encounter. In Gallop’s essay, an ideal reader seems to be
one who actually strives to eliminate personal thoughts (i.e., “preconceptions” or “stereotypes”) in order to
better appreciate the specificity of the other. With this sole focus on a reader’s responsibilities to the other,
Gallop’s sense of ethics seems to be a contemporary, practical example of Levinas’s philosophy.
The prominent queer theorist Eve Sedgwick outlines a different model of ethical reading in Touching
Feeling (2003). In “Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading,” the fourth chapter of her book, Sedgwick
presents two types of reading, “paranoid” and “reparative,” and discusses the benefits and drawbacks of
each.3 Sedgwick associates paranoid reading with a mistrust or suspicion of a text’s surface, a desire to
expose hidden meanings, and a theory of negative affects (2003, 130). While she acknowledges there are
benefits to paranoid reading, she also argues that, as a “mandatory injunction” (125) in American critical
theory, it has unfairly overshadowed other ways of knowing better suited to appreciating many of the things
she loves. She argues, for example, that the queer practice of camp is “seriously misrecognized when …
viewed … through paranoid lenses” and calls for a reparative reading to “do better justice to many of the
defining elements of classic camp performance” (149–50). Sedgwick’s goal in this chapter is to make a case
for the value of reparative reading, which she associates with a trust in (and embrace of) a text’s surface, as
well as with a theory of positive affects.
While Sedgwick is not as overt as Gallop in championing the ethical value of her preferred mode of
interpretation, I would argue her language highlights the ethical worth of reparative reading. In “Paranoid
Reading and Reparative Reading” Sedgwick writes, for example, that reparative reading can “do better
justice” to the queer practice of camp and she also evokes ethical language to discuss the benefit of this
approach for readers. “The desire of a reparative impulse,” she explains, “is additive and accretive. Its fear,
a realistic one, is that the culture surrounding it is inadequate or inimical to its nurture; it wants to assemble
and confer plenitude on an object that will then have resources to offer to an inchoate self” (2003, 149).
Similarly, Sedgwick also argues that “the reparative reading position” can teach us “the many ways selves
and communities succeed in extracting sustenance from the objects of a culture—even of a culture whose
avowed desire has often been not to sustain them” (150–51). In these passages, Sedgwick casts a reparative
impulse (and reading position) as ethically beneficial to culturally marginalized readers, since it allows
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them to create fat objects out of thin ones and thus obtain, for themselves, the “sustenance” they need to
survive.
Interestingly, this description of reparative reading in Touching Feeling echoes Sedgwick’s description
of her own reading habits a decade earlier in Tendencies (1993):
For me, a kind of formalism, a visceral near-identification with the writing I cared for, at the level of sentence
structure, metrical pattern, rhyme, was one way of trying to appropriate [the] … power of the chosen object
… this strong formalist investment didn’t imply (as formalism is generally taken to imply) … an evacuation of
interest … but quite the contrary: the need I brought to books and poems was hardly to be circumscribed, and
I felt I knew I would have to struggle to wrest from them sustaining news of the world, ideas, myself (and in
various senses) my kind. At any rate, becoming a perverse reader was never a matter of my condescension to
texts, rather of the surplus charge of my trust in them to remain powerful. (1993, 4)

Similar to the passages from Touching Feeling, this account also depicts the ethical benefits of a reparative
approach for a culturally marginalized (queer) reader—here for the benefit of Sedgwick herself. Paying
attention to the formal features of texts allows Sedgwick to get the “sustaining news” she needs. Interestingly,
this mode of reading, which I have been referring to as “ethical,” Sedgwick here calls “perverse” in the sense
that it refuses to obey the New Critical (“formalist”) requirement of disinterested interpretation.
Unlike Gallop’s model of reading, then, Sedgwick’s reparative approach does not feature a subject
completely given over to the other but rather a feisty reader attending carefully to texts to get what she
needs to survive. If Levinas’s ethics can be summarized as “love thy neighbor is oneself,” Sedgwick’s might
be encapsulated as “love thy neighbor to sustain oneself.” Sedgwick is advocating close reading here, but not
as a form of “condescension” to the other. In this way, she seems to be able to employ close reading to both
(1) do justice to texts and (2) obtain the nourishment she needs to survive. While Gallop casts a reader’s
personal interests as something that can inhibit the interpretive process (in the form of “stereotypes” and
“projections”), Sedgwick proposes a reader’s own needs may actually facilitate a more ethical treatment of
oneself and texts.
While Sedgwick does not link her sense of ethics to the work of feminist scholar Carol Gilligan, I believe
there are significant overlaps between the two. Gilligan is perhaps best known for her pioneering work of
feminist scholarship, In a Different Voice (1982), which demonstrated the existence of a moral outlook
distinct from the dominant idea in psychology that morality should derive from impartiality, rationality,
and universal principles of justice.4 Gilligan called this alternative vision an “ethics of care” and found
that women were more apt to enact it than men.5 Gilligan’s work in psychology ignited cross-disciplinary
reexaminations of ethical philosophy and spurred numerous publications, such as Mary Jeanne Larrabee’s
edited volume An Ethic of Care: Feminist and Interdisciplinary Perspectives (1993).
In “Beyond Caring,” a chapter in An Ethic of Care, Marilyn Friedman describes Gilligan’s “ethics of care”
as moral voice that “eschews abstract rules and principles,” “derives moral judgments from the contextual
details of situations grasped as specific and unique,” makes decisions based on “feelings of empathy
and compassion,” and whose “moral imperatives center around caring, not hurting others and avoiding
selfishness” (1993, 258–59). While many feminists critiqued Gilligan’s model for reinforcing the stereotype
of selfless womanhood, in her “Reply to Critics” (1993) Gilligan rejected this view and argued that her
concept included “a critical ethical perspective that calls into question the traditional equation of care with
self-sacrifice” (209). For Gilligan, then, a concern for one’s own survival and personal well-being was not
antithetical to an “ethics of care.”
With its focus on care for others, Gilligan’s framework clearly overlaps with Gallop’s sense of ethics.
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Despite the obviousness of this overlapping, however, I would argue Gilligan’s model is even closer to
Sedgwick’s way of reading for several reasons. Gilligan and Sedgwick both ground their sense of ethics in
particular subjects (or readers) negotiating moral problems in a specific context. Gilligan derived her model,
for example, from listening to individual women in the 1980s talk about solving actual moral dilemmas in
their daily lives, while Sedgwick’s sense of ethics emerged from her insights about queer readers’ attempts
to get sustenance in a hostile world (and her desire to do justice to resulting queer practices such as camp).
In addition, both scholars see emotional attachment, or partiality, as a resource for ethical encounters
rather than as a hindrance to such relations. Finally, both reserve a place for self-concern, or taking care of
one’s own needs, within their sense of ethics. In many ways, then, Sedgwick’s reparative reading seems to
be a contemporary queer example of Gilligan’s “ethics of care.”
As I stated in my introduction, in this paper I will use Gallop’s and Sedgwick’s models of ethical response
to evaluate one particularly charged scene of interpretation: the reaction of some American feminist critics
in the 1980s to the queerness of modernist women’s writing.6 I describe this scene as “charged” in the sense
that it took place in a hostile context (the patriarchal literary academy) where there was a lot at stake (for
feminist critics and for the queerness of modernist women’s writing). Feminist critics brought a range of
urgent expectations to their interaction with modernist women at this time, such as a desire to establish
a female tradition of writing as well as identify themes of female empowerment. At times, however, these
important goals may have unwittingly inhibited them from being able to hear the queerness in modernist
writing by women. The particular aim of this paper, then, is twofold: (1) to use Gallop’s and Sedgwick’s
models of ethical reading to evaluate feminist critics’ reaction to the queerness of modernist women’s
literature; and (2) to develop, from these observations, a grounded set of practices and principles for doing
justice to queerness in literary texts and everyday life.
As a point of clarification, it is not my intent to generate one definitive model of ethical reading. Rather,
I am employing Gallop’s and Sedgwick’s models, which themselves span multiple (sometimes conflicting)
philosophies, as a flexible framework to begin to assess the multiple ethics of feminist critics’ reaction to
the queerness of modernist women’s writing. I also want to acknowledge that the performance of an ethical
response is often suffused with factors beyond an individual critic’s control. As a result, when looking at
feminist criticism I will strive to account for some of the social obstacles that may have made it difficult
for a critic to enact an ethical reading. Some feminist critics, for example, may have foreclosed listening
to the queerness of a text out of a repudiation of “lesbian” or “queer” identifications that would have been
disempowering institutionally or personally. A sense of what it takes to ethically respond to queerness, in
practice, would be incomplete without considering such social factors.
I will be using the term queerness in this paper to refer to one particular kind of “unexpected difference”:
the strangeness of experimental poetic writing. While queerness can signify many things in the field of queer
theory, my use of this term emerges from the work of prominent queer theorist Michael Warner. In his 1993
book Fear of a Queer Planet, Warner characterizes “queer” as “resistance to regimes of the normal” (xxvi).
The experimental language of Gertrude Stein is a form of queerness in the sense that it challenges “normal”
discourse and works to resist the dominant linguistic “regime.”
I want to acknowledge that my use of the contemporary notion of “queer” to describe early twentiethcentury literature is anachronistic. But my project also draws on the meaning of this term in the modernist
era itself, at which time it had yet to be explicitly linked to homosexuality. In Queering the Moderns,
Anne Herrmann illustrates this last point when she writes: “In the modernist period queerness still
means ‘strange, odd, peculiar, eccentric, suspicious, dubious; not in a normal condition, out of sorts; bad,
worthless’” (2000, 6). It is also possible, then, to view the experimental writing of modernist women (as
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well as their creation of characters that move between identities) as “queer” in the modernist sense of this
word, i.e., as something most people view as strange, suspicious, and not in a normal condition.
When emphasizing that Stein was a “woman,” I follow the move of feminist critics who worked to create
space in the academy for “women’s literature” by drawing attention to the gender identity of the writers
they read; a prominent example of such work is Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar’s three-volume series
No Man’s Land: The Place of the Woman Writer in the Twentieth Century. A description of an author
as a woman, however, coexists with the fact that many female modernist authors embodied (and wrote
about) a transgression of the gender binary. Thus, my use of this term is not so much a reflection of Stein’s
self-identification as an indication of the way she has been valued by feminist scholars in the academy.
For feminist scholars, denominating writers as women has also been instrumental to locating them within
specific regimes of power and normativity, regimes that addressed these writers as individuals, in part,
through their socially identified gender.
My use of the term “response” to describe the act of reading signals my affiliation with the large,
theoretically diverse field of scholarship known as reader-response criticism. This field gained prominence
in the United States in the late 1970s and early 1980s and challenged the New Critical emphasis on “the
text itself.” Scholars associated with reader-response criticism include Louise Rosenblatt, Wolfgang Iser,
Stanley Fish, Wayne Booth, Jonathan Culler, and Roland Barthes. Like many of these authors, I also focus
my attention on the interaction between critics and texts and believe that readers play a significant role in
shaping a text’s meaning. But whereas some reader-response critics concentrate exclusively on the reader
at the expense of the text, my project is focused precisely on the point of contact between the two. My use
of the term “response” is also more specific than its connotation in the field of reader-response criticism,
where it can encompass the wide range of thoughts and feelings that are sparked by one’s interaction with
a text. In contrast, I am using the term to refer in particular to a critic’s reaction to queerness, understood
here as the writer’s use of experimental poetic language.
Historical Context for Feminist Critics’ Response to Modernist Women’s Writing
American feminist literary criticism first began to show a significant interest in modernist women’s writing
in the 1980s. Some prominent examples of feminist scholarship that concentrated on writers such as Stein,
Willa Cather, Nella Larsen, and H.D. during this decade include Susan Stanford Friedman’s Psyche Reborn:
The Emergence of H.D. (1981), Marianne DeKoven’s A Different Language: Gertrude Stein’s Experimental
Writing (1983), Gloria Hull’s Color, Sex, and Poetry: Three Women Writers of the Harlem Renaissance
(1987), and Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar’s No Man’s Land: The Place of the Woman Writer in the
Twentieth Century (1988).
With their criticism, these scholars further expanded the literary canon and developed strategies for
giving care and attention to literature that was previously neglected. Friedman’s Psyche Reborn, for
example, helped H.D.’s work gain acceptance in the literary canon, and DeKoven’s A Different Language
used the method of close reading in the context of French feminist, poststructuralist, and psychoanalytic
theory to engage elements in Stein’s writing that prior critics had overlooked. In their interaction with
modernist women’s writing, many feminist readers also sought to raise awareness about forms of social
difference in this writing that other critics had failed to acknowledge. Oftentimes this meant looking for the
presence of “lesbian” or “female” themes, as in Sexchanges, where Gilbert and Gubar attempted to establish
evidence of a “lesbian literary tradition” in the writing of H.D., Stein, and Djuna Barnes (1989, 215).
As they engaged with modernist women’s writing, however, feminist critics also encountered
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characters who moved across sexualities and genders (such as Tommy in Cather’s short story “Tommy the
Unsentimental”) or withheld their gender identity altogether (such as the narrator in Cather’s prologue to
My Àntonia). In addition, the experimental language of authors like H.D. and Stein frustrated many critics’
search for feminist thematic content. These odd textual elements challenged feminist critics looking for
identifiable lesbian and female themes by presenting other forms of difference than those the critics had
anticipated.
Could these “troubling” aspects of modernist women’s writing be one reason gynocritics largely avoided
this genre of literature throughout the 1970s?7 Helen Carr and Mary Eagleton provide some insight on
this in their respective contributions to A History of Feminist Literary Criticism (2007) on “A History of
Women’s Writing” and “Literary Representations of Women.” According to Carr, in the 1970s gynocritics,
influenced by the second wave of the women’s movement in the United States, were eager to locate moments
of “empowerment” and “liberation” in women’s literature (125–26). In addition, they wanted to establish a
particular kind of female tradition where, in contrast to Harold Bloom’s “anxiety of influence,” a critic “does
not want to ‘kill’ [her precursors] but to sustain and learn from them” (Eagleton 2007, 110). Given these
understandable desires, gynocritics often looked to women’s literature for “signs of the ‘heroic structure
[of] the female voice’” and “to find evidence of women who can think, act, love or exert power” (110).
The experimental language of modernist writers such as Stein and H.D., as well as the characters that
moved across genders in Cather’s fiction, would not have easily satisfied these gynocritical longings. And
whether intentionally or not, gynocritics did display a tendency to neglect the experimental literature
of female modernists despite their ostensible focus on women’s writing. This particular oversight is
acknowledged, among other places, in the introduction to Ellen Friedman and Miriam Fuchs’s Breaking
the Sequence: Women’s Experimental Fiction (1989):
Until recently, studies of women writers … overlooked the experimentalists. Classic works such as Ellen Moers’s
Literary Women (1976) and Patricia Meyer Spack’s The Female Imagination (1975) explore how social,
economic, political, and psychological factors influence the way women write and the way their characters
behave. Influential, pioneering studies such as Elaine Showalter’s A Literature of Their Own (1977) and Sandra
M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar’s The Madwoman in the Attic (1979) focus on women writers as a literary tradition
separate from men, but for the most part, they do not concern themselves with experimentalism. (xi–xii)

While gynocriticism was able to win respect for women’s writing, Friedman and Fuchs point out there
were forms of difference in female-authored texts that this school of criticism failed to address. Black
feminist critics and lesbian critics had already brought attention to a similar dynamic when they noted
how gynocriticism failed to account for differences among women in terms of race and sexuality. Here,
Friedman and Fuchs allude to another type of difference gynocritics overlooked: the “experimentalism” of
modernist women’s literature.
But how did modernist women’s writing fare in the hands of lesbian critics? Weren’t they able to embrace
female modernists with open arms? Authors such as Stein, H.D., Virginia Woolf, and Barnes were certainly
honored in the field of lesbian criticism as representatives of “Sapphic Modernism.” And scholars in this
field readily engaged with these authors’ work to establish a tradition of lesbian literature and attend to
what previous critics had ignored: “lesbian authors, lesbian texts, lesbian characters [and] lesbian images”
(Gonda 2007, 171).
Except in a few instances, however, Stein’s and H.D.’s experimental language was largely resistant to
these critics’ search for identifiable lesbian content. In addition, the characters that moved across genders
and sexualities in Cather’s fiction challenged many lesbian critics’ idea of gender and sexuality as fixed, stable
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identities. Like the gynocritics before them, then, lesbian critics also found certain aspects of modernist
women’s writing difficult and had a hard time responding to forms of difference they had not anticipated.
As a result, lesbian critics were also inclined to avoid modernist women’s experimental writing. Caroline
Gonda highlights this tendency in “Lesbian Feminist Criticism”:
Catherine Stimpson (1981) and Elizabeth Meese (1992) … have bemoaned what they see as lesbian critics’
comparative neglect of “difficult” or “experimental” literature; Bonnie Zimmerman notes the impact of lesbian
fiction readers’ desire for something “accessible, entertaining, and just ‘correct’ enough to be a bit bland.”
(Gonda 2007, 176)

Like gynocriticism, lesbian criticism can be seen as “ethical” in the sense that it also sought to honor
forms of difference previous critics had unfairly ignored (i.e., “lesbian” writing, authors, and themes).
Modernist women’s experimental writing, however, appears to have repeatedly tested the ethical limits of
both of these fields by asking gynocritics and lesbian literary scholars to respond to forms of difference they
had not anticipated.
In “A History of Women’s Writing,” Carr suggests that feminist criticism’s tendency to ignore the
experimental work of female modernists changed with the emergence of French feminist theory in the
1980s (2007, 131). DeKoven’s A Different Language (1983) is one example of American feminist criticism
that began to use ideas drawn from French feminists such as Hélène Cixous and Julia Kristeva to engage
Stein’s experimental writing. In the 1980s and 90s, the fields of poststructuralism, psychoanalysis, queer
theory, and postcolonial studies also gave feminist critics fresh tools to respond to modernist women’s
writing.8
Even with these additional theories, however, one thing has remained the same: engaging modernist
women’s writing is still no easy task. Feminist critics in the twenty-first century have continued to discuss
the challenges they face in confronting the work of authors such as Barnes, H.D., Cather, and Stein.9 And
in A Vocabulary of Thinking (2007), Deborah Mix contends that contemporary feminist critics still have
a tendency to avoid experimental writing by authors such as Stein. In an attempt to understand why this
trend persists, Mix turns to Carolyn Burke who, in Halfway to Revolution (1991), speculates that feminist
critics’ ongoing “difficulty hearing differently pitched … speech … produced by a writer known to be female”
occurs because “our expectation about what constitutes a ‘woman’s voice’ may put earmuffs on our capacity
to hear” (quoted in Mix 2007, 11).
This ongoing “hearing impairment” is one reason why I believe that looking at how feminist critics
respond to modernist women’s writing will be particularly productive for developing a contemporary model
of ethical reading. Modernist women’s literature often presented feminist critics with something different
than they expected to hear from a group of writers “known to be female.” This genre of writing, then, can
be regarded as a test case, so to speak, of feminist critics’ ability to carry out one of their core ethical ideals:
to do justice to forms of difference that others have unfairly neglected. A key question guiding the final
section of this paper, then, will be: How did feminist critics treat unexpected forms of difference—such as
queerness—when they encountered such elements in modernist women’s literature?
Two Feminist Responses to the Queerness of Stein’s Writing
In the remaining space of this paper, I will conduct a case study of three feminist critics’ response to a specific
type of queerness of modernist women’s literature. In particular, I will look at how Marianne DeKoven
(1983) and Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar (1989) react to Stein’s experimental writing. I was drawn to

38

Journal of Feminist Scholarship 5 (Fall 2013)

Kruse: Was That Ethical?

these two pieces of criticism because they offer opposing viewpoints on the meaning of Stein’s work: in A
Different Language, DeKoven concludes Stein’s writing represents “a form of anti-patriarchal language”
(1983, xviii), while in Sexchanges Gilbert and Gubar find it to be “a mode of mastery and masculinity”
(1989, 247). Depending on which study one reads, Stein’s writing is either the epitome or antithesis of
feminist praxis. Given these widely divergent viewpoints about the same author’s work, I became curious
about how these critics had arrived at their conclusions.
My primary purpose in this section is not to determine which of these perspectives on Stein’s writing
is “accurate” or “correct.” Many scholars have already debated the claims of A Different Language and
Sexchanges and there is no need to repeat their work here. Rather, I will focus on how DeKoven and Gilbert
and Gubar respond to Stein’s experimental writing and I will assess the ethics of their approach. To be clear,
however, my focus on methodology will lead me to discuss the validity of these studies in some way, in the
sense that I will be evaluating the critics’ capacity to hear what the queerness of Stein’s writing is “actually
saying,” rather than merely projecting their own stereotypes onto it (and thus silencing its voice).
In the context of the 1980s American literary academy there was a lot at stake in these critics’ assessment
of Stein. As leading feminist scholars, DeKoven and Gilbert and Gubar were well positioned to influence the
perception of Stein’s writing across the academy. Their response to its queerness matters, then, not only
as an isolated moment of ethical decision, but also as a significant event in the early stages of American
feminist criticism that had the power to shape other scholars’ view of Stein’s work. How, then, did these
feminist critics react when they encountered Stein’s experimental language?
In the introduction to A Different Language, DeKoven writes about adjusting her methodology in
response to the particularity of Stein’s work. “The features of the writing,” she explains, “determine the
methods of reading I employ” (xvii; italics mine). Here DeKoven presents Stein’s writing as a live actor
of sorts, with the power to influence the critic’s method. This passage lets us see that DeKoven is not only
paying attention to Stein’s writing but also allowing it to guide, or affect, her choices.
DeKoven continues to present Stein’s writing as a powerful live actor when she asserts that it “violates
grammatical convention, thereby preventing normal reading” (xiv). Here we learn that Stein’s writing
has the power to thwart “normal reading,” which, according to DeKoven, is an attempt “to form coherent,
single, whole, closed, ordered, finite, sensible meanings” (5) when interpreting a work. Since Stein’s writing
obstructs this approach, an alternative is needed: in particular, “a different kind of reading which opposes
itself to the dominant patriarchal culture in definable ways” (5). In this way, Stein’s writing could be said to
demand a particularly queer approach, as it requires a method opposed to both “normal reading” and “the
dominant patriarchal culture.”
In her introduction to A Different Language, DeKoven also identifies Stein’s writing as an exemplum
of “experimental writing” and “anti-patriarchal language.” As a form of “experimental writing,” Stein’s
work “disrupts conventional modes of signification and provides alternatives to them” (xiii). In particular,
Stein’s writing replaces modes that are “linear, orderly, closed, hierarchical, sensible” with ones that are
“incoherent, open-ended, anarchic, irreducibly multiple” (xiii). DeKoven also sees Stein’s work as a form of
“anti-patriarchal language” because it replaces “male” modes of signification with “female” ones.
DeKoven names two specific types of tools that she uses to engage Stein’s work: those that are helpful for
“distant looking” (i.e., “for standing back to get the larger picture”) and those helpful for “closer looking”
(i.e., “for taking a phrase, sentence, or paragraph and saying exactly where in it meaning resides”) (xvi).
She finds the terminology of “French feminist, poststructuralist, and psychoanalytic criticism” valuable for
“distant looking” because it helps her “treat the large cultural and political implications of the subversions
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which experimental writing enacts” (xvi). When it comes to “closer looking,” however, DeKoven finds
“Anglo-American ‘close reading’ … most helpful” (xvii).
Through close reading, DeKoven adopts a stance of openness toward Stein’s writing as she tries to hear
what it is saying in its own terms. Unlike other critics who come to Stein in search of a particular theme,
she allows herself to linger on the surface of Stein’s writing without immediately trying to ascertain its
“deeper” significance. Speaking about this way of reading, DeKoven makes the bold claim: “To benefit by
what Stein has to offer, we must accept the ‘militantly unintelligible’ surface without trying to find the ‘real
meaning’ beneath it” (xxiv). I find this sentence striking because here DeKoven casts close reading as vital
to obtaining sustenance from Stein’s work. In order to be able to use, or profit from, Stein’s anti-patriarchal
language, one has to first “accept the ‘militantly unintelligible’ surface” of her texts.
DeKoven’s claim echoes Sedgwick’s description of reparative reading, where a reader attends closely
to a difficult, powerful text to get sustenance to survive. It also echoes Gallop’s call for readers to focus on
“what is actually on the page … rather than some idea ‘behind the text’” (2000, 7). According to Gallop, this
orientation helps one see what a text is actually saying and meet the ethical obligation to respect the other.
For Sedgwick, reparative reading is ethical in the sense that it does justice to texts and allows culturally
marginalized subjects to get the nourishment they need to persist. While DeKoven doesn’t call her approach
ethical, it certainly resonates with both Sedgwick’s and Gallop’s senses of this term. As a result, I would
argue it is an example of the deployment of these models in the field of critical practice.
But what obstacles may DeKoven have faced in the early 1980s that might have made it difficult for her
to perform this kind of ethical response to queerness? DeKoven addresses this topic in the introduction to
her book when reflecting on the tendencies of critics, to whom she again refers with the collective pronoun
“we.” As she writes, “We are not used to talking about linguistic structure as political. We generally restrict
political analysis of literature to thematic content, or to those elements of style clearly related to it” (xx). In
this passage, DeKoven provides insight into the status quo of literary criticism circa 1980, when critics were
more apt to think of linguistic structure in aesthetic rather than political terms, and when politically minded
feminist critics were more apt to value the thematic content of women’s literature over its (merely aesthetic)
linguistic structure. By reading Stein’s experimental structure for its political significance, DeKoven bucked
the trend dominant among literary (and feminist) critics in the early 1980s. To enact an ethical reading of
Stein’s text in the 1980s, then, may have required DeKoven to become a methodological renegade of sorts,
countering the trend of most feminist literary criticism.
Since DeKoven was operating outside of the protocols for feminist literary criticism in the early 1980s,
it is perhaps not surprising that other feminist critics would question her “unorthodox” approach. This
occurs, for example, in Gilbert and Gubar’s Sexchanges, in a chapter on Stein entitled “‘She Meant What I
Said’: Lesbian Double Talk.” About midway through this chapter, the authors turn to a discussion of Stein’s
“Sonnets That Please,” “Brim Beauvais,” and “Susie Asado.” After discussing a few lines from each one of
these poems, they assert:
If we acquiesce in the theories of Julia Kristeva, as Schmitz and DeKoven have, this sort of baby talk would read
like a pre-Oedipal, pre-symbolic mode of playful, anarchic signification which calls into question the order,
hierarchy, linearity, and mastery of patriarchal discourse. (1989, 247)

In this passage, Gilbert and Gubar seem to warn of a collective hypothetical future, of what could happen
to us “if we acquiesce in the theories of Julia Kristeva, as Schmitz and DeKoven have.” The verb “acquiesce,”
here, carries a negative connotation of weakness and defeat; according to the American Heritage Dictionary,
it means “accepting something reluctantly, without protest.” DeKoven is thus presented (alongside
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Neil Schmitz) in a negative light as having passively accepted “the theories of Kristeva,” which, in turn,
acquire the aura of a pushy, coercive force. In this moment, Gilbert and Gubar are not directly challenging
DeKoven’s ideas per se, but rather implying that she was unable to resist the pressure of French feminist
theory. They also insinuate that being unduly influenced by a particular theoretical approach subverts the
critical process. These suggestions are made to undercut the credibility of DeKoven’s work, as she is cast as
a gullible dupe who does not possess the ability to decide (for herself) which theories to use.
So how do Gilbert and Gubar read Stein’s experimental writing in “Lesbian Double Talk”? To begin,
unlike DeKoven, they do not focus on Stein’s work alone, but rather read it alongside the fiction of other
modernist authors, as well as in relation to early twentieth-century historical events. Their chapter on Stein,
for example, appears in Sexchanges, the second volume (of three) in their larger project, No Man’s Land:
The Place of the Woman Writer in the Twentieth Century. In Sexchanges, Gilbert and Gubar investigate
the way “sex roles” were reconceived at the turn of the twentieth century as a result of sociohistorical factors
such as the crisis of masculinity that emerged after World War I, the opening of new economic and political
opportunities for women, and the formation of visible lesbian communities in Europe and the United
States. In their chapter on Stein, they focus, in particular, on “lesbian” modernists such as Radclyffe Hall,
Renée Vivien, H.D., and Djuna Barnes, reading selected works by these authors for, among other themes,
an indication of their views on the changing sex roles of the early twentieth century.10
But what, exactly, do Gilbert and Gubar mean by the “changing sex roles” of the early twentieth century?
This phrase is related to their interest in the discourse of sexuality that was circulating in the first decades
of the century as a result of the work of sexologists and writers such as Havelock Ellis, Magnus Hirschfeld,
Richard von Krafft-Ebing, Edward Carpenter, and Karl Heinrich Ulrichs, who introduced new ideas and
terminology about gender and sexuality into late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century culture. Gilbert
and Gubar highlight, for example, Ulrichs’s concept of “Urnings,” which he defined as beings “belonging
distinctly to one sex as far as their bodies are concerned [but] belong[ing] mentally and emotionally to the
other” (quoted in Gilbert and Gubar 1989, 216; italics in the original). Ulrichs presented homosexuality
as a form of gender inversion and suggested that a lesbian should be viewed as a “male soul [trapped] in
a female body” (quoted in Gilbert and Gubar 1989, 216; italics in the original). In “Lesbian Double Talk,”
then, when Gilbert and Gubar evoke the work of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century sexologists
such as Ulrichs as a site of changing “sex roles,” they are referring to new ideas about gender and sexuality,
not just revisions to gender ideology alone.
As a troubling side note, Gilbert and Gubar uncritically adopt the logic of Ulrichs’s (discredited) view of
lesbianism as a form of gender inversion when speculating about the literary tradition of lesbian modernists.
We see this when they wonder:
[W]hat literary tradition was there … for the woman artist who felt her erotic destiny to be alien from the scripts
culturally identified with her anatomy? What community could she find in which she could commune with
others who, like her, felt other than their bodies?” (217; italics mine)

In this passage Gilbert and Gubar assume that all lesbian modernists were gender inverts who “felt other
than their bodies.” This is, of course, the very assumption at work in Ulrichs’s definition of “Urnings” as
beings “belonging distinctly to one sex as far as their bodies are concerned [but] belong[ing] mentally and
emotionally to the other.” Thus, while Gilbert and Gubar express an interest in finding out how lesbian
modernists themselves felt about the ideas of early sexologists, in this passage they seem more interested
in using this “science” to make sense of modernist women writers. In doing so, they reenact the “knowing”
stance of these physicians, as they too presume to understand how modernist authors felt about their
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bodies. This, I would argue, is an unethical response to queerness, as it fails to listen to how modernist
women themselves, in their lives and work, expressed alternative senses of gender and sexuality.
In Sexchanges, however, Gilbert and Gubar are not only interested in how lesbian modernists felt about
changing sex roles but also in how they drew on lesbian literary tradition in their work. It is not surprising
Gilbert and Gubar would want to trace the presence of a lesbian literary tradition in modernist women’s
writing, since one of the goals of gynocriticism itself throughout the 1970s was the establishment of a
tradition of women’s literature. As I have already mentioned, according to Mary Eagleton, Elaine Showalter
envisioned gynocriticism as a place where “[r]eader, author, and character come together in … a shared
‘female subculture’” (Eagleton 2007, 108). Gilbert and Gubar’s desire to locate the presence of a lesbian
tradition, then, fits with an ideal of gynocriticism. I would simply note that this particular reading agenda
presumes lesbian modernists shared one of the same goals as contemporary feminist critics. While here
Gilbert and Gubar are on the lookout for a particular form of difference (the presence of a lesbian literary
tradition), it will be interesting to see how they respond to a form of difference they don’t seem to anticipate:
the queerness of Stein’s experimental writing.
Unlike DeKoven, Gilbert and Gubar repeatedly approach Stein’s experimental writing with a particular
set of questions in mind (i.e., How did Stein view the changing sex roles? When did she draw on literary
predecessors?). Interestingly, these questions often lead Gilbert and Gubar to blur the distinction between
Stein the author and her work, as Stein’s writing is assumed to represent her personal beliefs. In contrast to
DeKoven, they do not shift their method in response to the particularity of Stein’s work, but rather employ
a “one-size-fits-all” approach to engage a diverse range of modernist literature.
One place we see this approach is when Gilbert and Gubar endeavor to outline the presence of a lesbian
literary tradition across a range of modernist women’s writing. Whatever literary genre they encounter
(whether it be Cather’s fiction, H.D.’s poetry, Barnes’s satire, or Stein’s experimental writing), their method
remains the same: they look for thematic content that indicates the authors’ relation to the ancient Greek
poet Sappho. By maintaining this focus, Gilbert and Gubar are able to identify similarities and differences
in modernist women’s view of Sappho. This is evident in comparative phrases such as “Like Cather, who
especially admired Sappho’s creation … Reneé Vivien was fascinated with Sappho’s lines” (226) and “For
Lowell, as for Vivien and H.D., Sappho embodies the elemental grandeur of a ‘leaping fire’” (234; italics
mine).
When they come to Stein’s experimental writing, Gilbert and Gubar persist in their approach. But what
they find in Stein’s writing is different from before: unlike other lesbian modernists, “Stein refused all
predecessors” (238). With this statement, Gilbert and Gubar present Stein as exception to other lesbian
modernists (who, they claim, all had some relation to Sappho), as well as opposed to a key objective of
gynocriticism itself (the establishment of a tradition of women’s writing). As evidence of their claim,
they quote the following passage from Stein’s Lectures in America (1935): “If you write the way it has
already been written … then you are serving mammon, because you are living by something some one has
already been earning or has earned” (quoted in Gilbert and Gubar 2007, 238). In regarding this excerpt of
experimental writing as evidence that Stein “refused all literary predecessors,” Gilbert and Gubar seem to
engage in both the intentional fallacy and what DeKoven calls “normal reading” (i.e., an attempt to form
a “coherent, single, whole, closed, ordered, finite, sensible meaning” when reading a work). In their own
“normal reading,” Gilbert and Gubar make the excerpt from Stein’s Lectures in America mean one thing:
evidence of Stein’s rejection of a literary tradition.
While DeKoven argues that Stein’s experimental writing proliferates meaning in a way that makes
it impossible to restrict its significance to a single idea, Gilbert and Gubar repeatedly claim to know the
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sole meaning of various aspects of Stein’s work. They assert, for example, that “Stein’s texts can … only
function as Rorschach tests” and “the only meaning … [her] sentences … establish is the point that, in
Stein’s words, ‘Grammar is in our power’” (247; italics mine). In these passages, Gilbert and Gubar imply
they have been able to determine the sole meaning of Stein’s writing and consequently dissuade further
critical investigation. Since the mystery has been solved, the case closed, we can all go home now as there
is nothing else to see.
In addition to looking for the presence of a lesbian literary tradition, Gilbert and Gubar also read Stein’s
experimental writing for insight into the tension she felt by rejecting all literary predecessors while still
relying on Alice Toklas. While engaged in this task, Gilbert and Gubar frequently use one excerpt from
Stein’s experimental writing to interpret another, which often involves using the first one to make the second
reveal something about Stein’s relation to Alice. In this way, Gilbert and Gubar seem to employ Stein’s own
words to erase the queerness of her writing (i.e., its identity as a form of experimental, not conventional,
language). As they look across Stein’s oeuvre to get a sense of how she treated Alice, for example, Gilbert
and Gubar write passages such as this:
A fitting tribute to the woman [Alice Toklas] who would later compose a famous cookbook, “Lifting Belly” also
illuminates Stein’s chant in “Patriarchal Poetry” (1927):
I double you, of course you do. You double me, very likely to be. You double I double I double you double. I
double you double me I double you you double me. (YGS 115)
The speaker’s decision here “To be we to be to be we” is made possible by “the wife of my bosom” who “makes
of her husband / A proud and happy man” (YGS 124). Like a character in her late novel Ida (1941), Stein was
clearly “tired of being just one.” (244)

In asserting that “Lifting Belly” (along with a character from Ida) “illuminates Stein’s chant in ‘Patriarchal
Poetry,’” Gilbert and Gubar employ elements from two different works by Stein to shed light on a third. In
the end, however, they use all of these textual elements to understand a fourth, more ephemeral “text”: the
personal dynamic between Gertrude and Alice.
After quoting the excerpt from “Patriarchal Poetry,” Gilbert and Gubar use a line from “Lifting Belly”—
“To be we to be to be we”—to signify the meaning of “the speaker’s decision.” They then employ two more
lines from “Lifting Belly” (“the wife of my bosom” and “makes of her husband / A proud and happy man”)
to signify who has made this decision “possible.” Up until this point, Gilbert and Gubar have not explicitly
identified the speaker of “Patriarchal Poetry” as Stein herself, nor have they overtly named “Alice” as the
one who makes the speaker’s decision possible. But if there is any doubt about this, it is completely erased in
the final sentence, as they assert: “Stein was clearly ‘tired of being just one.’” All of the excerpts from Stein’s
writing are now tied to Stein herself, as Gilbert and Gubar encourage us to see this fictional writing as
evidence of Stein’s personal feelings of regret (for trying to go it alone) and newfound desire to collaborate
with Alice. Here Gilbert and Gubar not only engage in the intentionally fallacy (as they blur all distinction
between Stein and her writing), but they also fail to listen to the “voice” of Stein’s experimental writing itself
by forcing it to signify biographical facts.
It is interesting to note that Gilbert and Gubar’s interpretation of this passage brings Stein closer to
their view of other lesbian modernists and the ideology of gynocriticism. But whether or not this is “really”
how Stein felt, I don’t think we can find the answer to such a question in her texts. My main concern is that
by regarding Stein’s writing as if it were a representation of her personal ideas, Gilbert and Gubar silence
the queerness of her experimental work. While they repeatedly look to Stein’s work for insight into her
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personal life, and often try to make excerpts of her writing mean one particular thing, I would argue (along
with DeKoven) that Stein’s work resists this type of “normal reading” and thus should be approached in an
alternative, more ethical way.
What is it, then, that could have caused Gilbert and Gubar to so thoroughly ignore the queerness of
Stein’s experimental writing in this particular chapter? One of the answers might be that Stein (and her
writing) represented to them some of the worst features of patriarchy, such as male mastery, violence, and
theft. Toward the end of “Lesbian Double Talk,” for example, Gilbert and Gubar assert that “a number of
readers have felt victimized by Stein’s impenetrable sentences,” and propose that the writer was able to
“turn her words into weapons [to] rob her readers of their ability to comprehend” (249; italics mine). In a
passage with particularly heightened rhetoric, they also argue that by writing the Autobiography of Alice B.
Toklas, Stein committed “a kind of cannibalism, as Stein makes Alice into a character of her own devising”
(251; italics mine).
In these passages, Stein and her work appear as violent, threatening forces, and Stein is cast as an
abusive husband who harms Alice Toklas. Like DeKoven, then, Gilbert and Gubar are also worried about
violence, but whereas DeKoven focuses on the way a critic can “violate” Stein’s writing, Gilbert and Gubar
are concerned with how Stein (and her work) can “victimize” a female reader or lover. This view of Stein’s
work seems to have made it difficult for Gilbert and Gubar to open up to Stein’s writing and, as DeKoven
insists on doing, “accept [its] ‘militantly unintelligible’ surface.” How do you begin to trust something you
fear? A desire to protect oneself against harm and ensure one’s own well-being is a part of Gilligan’s “ethics
of care” and Sedgwick’s reparative reading.
Gilbert and Gubar also imply that Stein’s writing enabled her to acquire a masculine identity. We see
this when they assert that her “unmaking is a form of composition that confers masculinity” and that
“the unmaking of language … remains for [Stein] a mode of mastery and of masculinity” (247; italics
mine). They refer to Stein as “a female man” (250) and propose that she “exploit[ed] a strategy of male
impersonation … to appropriate male authority” (239). In these passages, Gilbert and Gubar cast Stein’s
desire to move across genders (from female to male) in a negative light. For them, in seeking masculinity,
Stein only replicates the worst traits associated with men: a desire to dominate, silence, and control women.
In “Lesbian Double Talk,” then, Gilbert and Gubar could be said to perpetuate the negative stereotype that
female-to-male (FTM) individuals only acquire the worst traits of masculinity. This stereotype has caused a
number of feminist critics to preemptively reject transgender scholarship and unfairly disregard the many
FTM individuals who are striving to animate a pro-feminist identity in our culture today. Unfortunately,
a feminist female masculinity did not seem to be a possibility in Gilbert and Gubar’s work, where Stein’s
desire to “be a man” could only be associated with her threat to women readers, her female lover, and
gynocriticism itself.
While I can understand why Gilbert and Gubar may have had a hard time listening to Stein’s writing,
I would still say their treatment of Stein’s work in “Lesbian Double Talk” largely represents an unethical
response to queerness since they never try to hear Stein’s experimental writing on its own terms. Sedgwick
may remind us, of course, that as culturally marginalized readers in the male-dominated literary academy
of the 1980s, Gilbert and Gubar could have had ethical reasons for being unresponsive to Stein’s work.
But Gallop might point out that their frequent projections onto Stein’s life and work inhibited them from
meeting their ethical obligation to the other. In this vein, Sedgwick might add that by failing to wrestle
with Stein’s actual words—to attend closely to the particularity of these texts—Gilbert and Gubar missed
the chance to not only do justice to Stein’s work but also get sustaining resources for themselves, resources
DeKoven seemed to be able to acquire (in the form of feminist insights) by staying attuned to the queer
surface of Stein’s writing.
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Relevance for Contemporary Conversations on Ethical Reading
What relevance does this review of feminist criticism hold for the contemporary assertion that the humanities
are best suited to teach ethical reading? If the humanities are to position themselves as such, they should
not treat all readers as synonymous, but rather acknowledge that individuals occupy particular positions
within systems of privilege and oppression and accept that these locations can impact the needs specific
readers bring to an interpretive encounter. Sedgwick’s reparative reading, for example, helps us see that a
culturally marginalized reader’s desire to get sustenance from texts can be part of an ethical interpretation.
Gilligan’s concept of an “ethics of care” is useful here, as it enables us to see that morality emanates not
only from abstract principles but also from particular subjects who live in specific contexts. Gilligan and
Sedgwick also remind us that a personal attachment to texts (and people) is not antithetical to an ethical
response, but can facilitate a just treatment of others and oneself.
In addition, however, I think it is important to acknowledge how difficult it can be to respect others—
especially those we perceive to be challenging or difficult. If ethically minded feminist critics found it hard
to listen to the queerness of modernist women’s writing, how can we expect such a response to be easy
for students? When students are confronted with a type of writing (or identity) they do not immediately
understand, what will they do? The humanities can be a place where students develop the capacity to
respect others, and I agree with Gallop that close reading is an essential pedagogical tool for achieving this
goal. Sedgwick also promotes the value of close reading, but for the double benefit of doing justice to texts
and helping readers get what they need to survive. While close reading was once synonymous with New
Criticism, I am hopeful it will acquire a new connotation as a feminist and queer tool for ethics. I say this
because in order to help students do justice to texts we need to not only clarify what we mean by “ethical
reading” but also identify strategies (like close reading) that can help them achieve this goal in practice.
Gallop and Sedgwick help us see that it is possible to repurpose the New Critical tool of close reading
for a twenty-first-century feminist and queer ethics—and this valuable insight should be more widely
acknowledged in the humanities today.

Notes
1. It is important to note that the New Critics assumed close reading was best suited to a particular style of writing
emblematic of the white male canon (a style that was difficult, dense, belletristic, and arcane) and appropriate for a very
particular purpose: to grasp the coherent structure of a great work of art.
2. Marjorie Garber, for example, dedicated her latest book, The Use and Abuse of Literature (2012), “to Jane Gallop,
a wonderful close reader.”
3. For Sedgwick, these two types of reading are reflective of the “positions” Melanie Klein argues infants take up (and
move between) in relation to part objects. Following Klein, Sedgwick maintains that most readers shift between these
two mutually productive positions.
4. It is important to note that Gilligan was just one of many scholars contributing to the field of feminist ethical philosophy in the 1980s and 1990s. Other prominent contributions include Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach
to Ethics and Moral Education (1984); Sarah Hoagland, Lesbian Ethics (1988); Alison Jaggar, Living with Contradictions: Controversies in Feminist Social Ethics (1994); and Claudia Card, On Feminist Ethics and Politics (1999).
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5. While Gilligan’s work was critiqued for perpetuating gender essentialism, I believe this was an unfair representation of her work. In “Reply to Critics” (1986), Gilligan deftly addresses this misreading by reminding readers: “The title
of my book was deliberate; it reads, ‘in a different voice,’ not ‘in a woman’s voice’.… The care perspective in my rendition
is neither biologically determined nor unique to women” (1993, 209).
6. I would like to thank the anonymous reviewer who pointed out that since I am reading literary criticism in this paper there is another scene of interpretation that could be analyzed here, in addition to the one between feminist critics
and modernist women’s writing: the one between myself and feminist criticism of the 1980s. I agree with the reviewer,
as I am not only striving to articulate an idea of ethics but also working to carry it out in practice.
7. Since from now on I will be referring to groups of readers as “gynocritics” or “lesbian critics,” it is important to
note that I am not creating these categories myself but rather reiterating distinctions employed by Helen Carr and others in A History of Feminist Literary Criticism (2007) edited by Gill Plain and Susan Sellers.
8. While it would be impossible to list here the dozens of feminist scholars who used ideas from these fields to engage
modern women’s writing in the 1980s and 1990s, notable examples include Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s “Unmaking
and Making in To the Lighthouse” (1980), Rachel Blau DuPlessis’s “Woolfenstein” (1989), Susan Stanford Friedman’s
Psyche Reborn: The Emergence of H.D. (1981), Ellen Berry’s Curved Thought and Textual Wandering: Gertrude
Stein’s Postmodernism (1992), Judith Butler’s “Passing, Queering: Nella Larsen’s Psychoanalytic Challenge” (1993),
and Ann DuCille’s The Coupling Convention: Sex, Text, and Tradition in Black Women’s Fiction (1993).
9. Influential works of twenty-first-century feminist criticism that highlight the ongoing difficulty of engaging modernist women’s writing include Adalaide Morris’s How to Live What to Do: H.D.’s Cultural Poetics (2003), Heather K.
Love’s Feeling Backward: Loss and the Politics of Queer History (2007), and Daniela Caselli’s Improper Modernism:
Djuna Barnes’s Bewildering Corpus (2009). On Stein in particular, see Barbara Will’s Gertrude Stein: Modernism and
the Problem of Genius (2000), Juliana Sphar’s Everybody’s Autonomy: Connective Reading and Collective Identity
(2001), and Deborah Mix’s A Vocabulary of Thinking: Gertrude Stein and Contemporary North American Women’s
Innovative Writing (2007).
10. I have placed the word “lesbian” in quotes here to indicate that this is Gilbert and Gubar’s term, not mine, and to
acknowledge that there is considerable debate among scholars over the gender identity and sexuality of these authors.
While I will not continue to place “lesbian” in quotes throughout this essay, it should be understood that I do not necessarily endorse this designation.
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